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ed with an armed conflict, with  relatively modest  resources. This  study highlights 
that the choice of baseline rates  is a key factor  in determining the  level of excess 
mortality when  data  points  are  scarce.  This  study  produced  a  range  of  plausible 
estimates of excess mortality between 1 and 1.9 million population rather than a 
single best estimate. The range of excess mortality produced in this study is narrower 
and  less  extreme when  compared  to previous  studies  on  the  same  conflict.  As  a 
further  contribution  to  the  debate  in  this  field,  the  current  study  advocates 
producing a range of plausible estimates rather than a single best estimate of excess 






The overarching objective of this paper is to analyse the demographic 
consequences of the 1998-2004 conflict in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). An armed conflict and the violence associated with it have 
significant demographic consequences, which in turn can lead to a wide 
range of other social and economic implications (Urdal, 2012, p. 130; 
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Matthew, 2012, p. 140). These demographic consequences can be as-
sessed over time and space for all three components of population 
change: mortality, fertility and migration (Brunborg, Tabeau, 2005, pp. 3-
6). It is worth noting that assessing the extent of excess mortality is par-
ticularly challenging in the case of the DRC; where there is a significant 
lack of vital statistics or indeed a data management culture. For this and 
many other reasons, only a limited number of studies have, so far, re-
searched the extent of mortality associated with the DRC armed conflict. 
Studies specifically looking at the consequences of armed conflict on mor-
tality have used terms including: «excess deaths» and/or «excess mortali-
ty» to describe the number of deaths that occurred to a given population 
over and above the number to be expected in the absence of the conflict 
(Heuveline, 1998; Burnham et	al., 2004; Lambert, Lohlé-Tart, 2008). The 
analytical framework adopted in the current study derives excess mortal-
ity as one of the three components of the overall population change. In 
other words, the current study considered not only mortality, but also the 
potential impact that could be attributed to fertility and forced migration 
during the considered period. 
To achieve its overarching aim, the current paper seeks to inform policy 
and promote peace in a post-armed conflict situation. The primary pur-
pose of the current paper is not to engage in a kind of comparison of mor-
tality estimates contest with previous studies on this topic, including 
Roberts et	al. (2003), Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2008) and Coghlan et	al. 
(2009), which assessed the extent and scope of excess mortality associat-
ed with the 1998-2004 DRC armed conflict. Estimates of mortality de-
rived from the current study can, to a certain extent, lend themselves to 
comparison with those from previous studies. Such comparison is not in-
tended as the main purpose of the current paper but would nevertheless 
contribute to extending the debate on this topic. This is even more impor-
tant, as the previous studies produced contrasting estimates of war-in-
duced mortality (see Human Security Report, 2011, and Sciencemag, 
2010, for reviews), and there is still no clear evidence on which of the 
previous estimates is closer to the truth. 
This paper is organised as follows: the first section presents the rationale 
behind this study, the second section provides a background to the DRC 
armed conflict, the third section discusses previous work on excess mor-
tality associated with the DRC armed conflict, the fourth section intro-
duces the data and methods used to derive the needed estimates, where-
as the fifth section presents and discusses findings, and the last section 
explores some of the implications before drawing conclusions. 
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Rationale 
This study refers to the following two periods: 1998-2004 and 1998-
2007. The first one (1998-2004) represents the period of the DRC armed 
conflict, which ended following a peace agreement signed in 2003 be-
tween different factions involved that led to the formation of a coalition 
government in the DRC in 2005 and a constitutional referendum in 2006 
(Participants, Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003). The second one 
(1998-2007) refers to the period over which the demographic impact of 
the conflict is assessed. The second period (1998-2007) was set out to 
provide practical measurable reference points, but also to allow compar-
isons with the existing studies of Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2008) and 
Coghlan et	al. (2009), as they both used the 1998-2007 period to estimate 
excess mortality associated with the DRC conflict. 
Earlier studies on this topic seem to have focussed on producing a single 
«best» estimate of war-induced mortality rather than a range of plausible 
estimates, disregarding the prospect of any uncertainty associated with 
the data and the analysis process. Both Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2008) 
and Coghlan et	al. (2009) produced their excess mortality figures without 
taking into account any uncertainty associated with both the assumptions 
made and the data used to derive the estimates of interest. The current 
paper used an alternative approach exploring two scenarios: factual and 
counter-factual, for selected sets of DRC population data combined under 
a set of plausible assumptions (Heuveline, 1998). 
In particular, any estimates of the excess mortality associated with armed 
conflicts are controversial. Often, this is due to various interests at play 
and the political sensitivities within which they tend to be wrapped. In 
this respect, producing single «best» figures as in Coghlan et	al. (2009) or 
in Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2008) might unwittingly contribute to ex-
tending the controversy. The uncertainties associated with both the as-
sumptions and the data used to conduct a comprehensive assessment of 
demographic consequences associated with armed conflict justify the 
need for a method that allows the production of a range of plausible esti-
mates (Heuveline, 1998, 2015, pp. 205-208). 
Background to the conflict 
The origin of the DRC armed conflict can be traced back to both internal 
and external causes. 
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Internal causes 
The DRC has experienced continued periods of instability and conflict 
since becoming an independent state in 1960. Soon after independence, 
the situation in the country was characterised by violence and the prolif-
eration of rebel groups vying for both political power and economic dom-
ination. By the mid-1960s, following a military coup led by Mobutu Sese 
Seko, the country saw a gradual improvement in security. From the late 
1960s to the late 1970s the country was marked by relative stability that 
enabled economic growth and an overall improvement in the lives of 
many Congolese (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1970). 
Despite going through a period of apparent stability from the mid-1960s, 
one of the most brutal dictatorships on the African continent also started 
to take hold of the country. The Mobutu regime indulged in poor gover-
nance and the shutting down of political space. From the early 1980s, 
growing pressure both inside and outside the country led the regime 
gradually to open up the political space by allowing a multi-party system 
and more freedom for the press. However, this process was plagued with 
delays and failed promises that led to further chaos and growing frustra-
tion. By the early 1990s a sense of generalised crisis was widely percepti-
ble, casting serious doubt about the viability of the country as a fully func-
tioning state (Naniuzeyi, 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). The vulnerabili-
ties that characterised the country in the 1990s culminated in a civil war 
that saw Congolese rebels led by Laurent Désiré Kabila and his allies 
overthrow the Mobutu regime in 1997. 
Under the Mobutu regime and the years leading to the armed conflict cov-
ered in this paper, the quality of life for the Congolese deteriorated. The 
kleptocratic character of the regime and its mismanagement of public 
resources meant that public servants were unpaid for several months, if 
not years. To make ends meet, many members of the armed forces and 
the police preyed on civilians in violation of the latter’s basic human 
rights (Human Rights Watch, 1998; Research Directorate, Immigration 
and Refugee Board, Canada, 1997). Public services were performed on 
the basis of bribery and kickbacks. During the Mobutu regime the country 
accumulated a public external debt of roughly $14 billion whilst Mobutu 
and his ruling class extracted wealth from the country. By 1990, real capi-
tal flight from Zaïre, as the country was known between 1971 and 1997, 
was estimated at $12 billion (Ndikumana, Boyce, 1998, p. 199). The 
educational and health systems were neglected, leading to a growing 
shortage of skills. Out-migration, both to other African countries and to 
Europe, was common, fuelled by a lack of opportunities within the DRC 
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and the increase in opportunities elsewhere, as those with skills wanted 
to migrate to places where conditions were more conducive to their 
aspirations (Flahaux, Schoumaker, 2016). 
The vulnerabilities of the economy and politics paved the way for a set of 
internal struggles that contributed to the onset and development of the 
armed conflict covered in this paper. Beside the state of collapse in which 
the country was at the onset of the armed conflict in the late 1990s, a 
number of external factors played a determinant role in triggering and 
exacerbating the conflict. 
External causes 
From a different angle, the armed conflict can be seen as the result of a 
spill-over from the 1994 civil war that culminated in the Rwandan geno-
cide (United Nations Security Council, 1994). Faced with a generalised 
crisis following many years of poor governance and mismanagement, a 
sudden influx of around 1.5 million refugees fleeing civil war in Rwanda 
(United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1998; Verpoorten, 2005), 
proved too much for the Zaïre regime to cope with. Among those fleeing 
Rwanda were Hutu extremists and defeated members of the then Rwan-
dan army. These groups managed to cross into Zaïre with their military 
apparatus and command structure intact (Prunier, 2009). 
The presence of Rwandan refugees and the uncontrolled circulation of 
weapons of war in eastern Zaïre gave rise not only to a severe humanitari-
an crisis, but also to diplomatic tensions which led to a military escalation 
between Zaïre and the new regime in Rwanda. In 1996, with the aim of 
neutralising threats posed by Hutu extremists and remnants from the 
defeated Rwandan army, the regime in Kigali formed an alliance with 
Congolese rebels and other neighbouring countries including Uganda and 
Burundi to start a military campaign in eastern Zaïre (Reyntjens, 1999). 
During this military campaign, different members of the alliance pursued 
their own goals and objectives. The Rwandan regime set out to eradicate 
threats posed by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda 
formed of Hutu extremists and remnants from the defeated/previous 
Rwandan regime; Ugandan armed forces targeted the Allied Democratic 
Forces, a rebel group opposed to the Ugandan government and consid-
ered by the latter to be a terrorist organisation; and the Burundian army 
sought this opportunity to neutralise the rebel Force for the Defence of 
Democracy (Prunier, 2009). 
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By late May 1997, and despite pursuing different interests, the forces that 
formed the alliance managed to overthrow the Mobutu regime and par-
tially to neutralise the various rebel groups that posed threats to member 
states within the alliance. By 1998, a deterioration in relations between 
the new regime in the country, renamed Democratic Republic of the Con-
go (DRC), and other members of the alliance led to the 1998 war. The new 
leader in the DRC (Laurent Désiré Kabila) fell out with his key allies the 
leaders of Rwanda (Paul Kagame) and Uganda (Yoweri Museveni) 
prompting a new and more complex armed conflict involving more than 
six different nations and dozens of armed groups and dozens of local 
militias (International Crisis Group, 1998). At its most critical stage, the 
conflict saw the country being divided into three different areas adminis-
tered by three different warring factions whilst the central government 
held the capital city Kinshasa and the major parts of the mineral rich 
Katanga province. However, by 2004, a combination of pressure and 
sanctions from the United Nations, regional players, and the international 
community as well as internal dynamics led to a settlement that paved 
the way to a progressive return to peace. Key protagonists agreed to a 
power sharing agreement that allowed the adoption of the new constitu-
tion in 2005 and subsequently the organisation of the first democratic 
elections since 1960s. Nevertheless, there are still, as of November 2019, 
armed groups operating in pockets of insecurity and numerous human 
right abuses, especially in the eastern part of the country (Stearns et	al., 
2013; United Nations News, 2019). 
Previous work on the demographic impact of the conflict 
Population change or excess mortality? 
Existing studies of the demographic impact of the conflict have looked at 
excess	mortality or excess	deaths (Coghlan et	al., 2009; Lambert, Lohlé-
Tart, 2008). Population change can be defined as an analytical category 
that factors all three components of population change including births, 
deaths and migration. Hence, despite the focus on excess mortality, this 
paper endeavoured to put it in a wider context and examine the overall 
population change, both conceptually and practically. Conceptually, be-
cause it encompasses an analysis of births (or fertility), deaths (or mortal-
ity) and migration to estimate the overall demographic change (Hinde, 
1998, p. 2) associated with the armed conflict; practically, because it al-
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lows the use of both factual and counter-factual scenarios when conduct-
ing population projections (Siegel, Swanson, 2008). It turns out that the 
net impact of the DRC armed conflict on population change through fertil-
ity and migration was not large during the considered period: excess 
mortality has been the main determinant component, allowing therefore, 
comparison with existing studies. The actual impact of both fertility and 
migration is discussed in the results section of this paper. 
Existing studies 
The only two existing studies to have investigated the demographic im-
pact of the DRC armed conflict for the period 1998-2007 are those of the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) (Roberts et	al., 2003; Coghlan et	
al., 2006, 2009), and Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2008)3. As a world-leading 
humanitarian organisation, the IRC is well known for monitoring crisis 
situations in developing countries. It is highly regarded by governments 
and non-governmental organisations around the world. Hence, the esti-
mates of excess mortality produced by the IRC would be expected to be a 
significant factor in informing national and international policy on issues 
related to armed conflict and their effects on population (United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010). However, de-
spite its renowned humanitarian interventions, often in challenging set-
tings, several methodological aspects of studies commissioned by the IRC 
on the demographic impact of armed conflict in the DRC are open to chal-
lenge. 
Between 2000 and 2007 a series of five retrospective mortality surveys 
commissioned by the IRC were conducted in the DRC with the aim of as-
sessing the extent and scope of excess mortality associated with the 
armed conflict for the period 1998-2007 (Roberts et	al., 2003; Coghlan et	
al., 2006, 2009). The IRC’s surveys were conducted in April and May 
2000, March 2001, September and November 2002, April to July 2004 
and May to July 2007. Two main concerns can be raised in relation to the 
IRC’s overall approach and consequently the findings from these surveys 
(Sciencemag, 2010; Human Security Report, 2011). 
– The IRC’s earlier retrospective surveys used cluster samples mainly in elect-
ed health zones from areas affected by the armed conflict in eastern regions 
                                            
3. This is an unpublished internal document that was mentioned in a number of 
newspapers including lalibre.be and lemonade.fr. It is available on the following link: 
http://adrass.net/WordPress/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Surmortalite_en_RDC_19 
98_2004.pdf [accessed 9 April 2020]. 
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of the DRC. The results of these surveys were extrapolated to the national 
level to generalise findings (Coghlan et	al., 2006, p. 46), even though much of 
the rest of the country was less affected by conflict. 
– The IRC chose to use the average sub-Saharan crude death rate of 1.5 deaths 
per 1’000 population per month in the year 2004 as the baseline mortality. 
This baseline crude death rate was then compared against mortality rates 
generated from retrospective surveys for the conflict period of 2.1 deaths 
per 1’000 population per month. The difference between these two generat-
ed the excess deaths. 
Although the IRC’s last three surveys were conducted from clusters 
pulled at the national level, the fact that its first two were drawn from 
sub-national clusters known to be affected by the war, contributed to a 
very high estimate of excess mortality of 5.4 million population between 
1998 and 2007 (Pedersen, 2009). The IRC’s use of an average sub-Saha-
ran crude death rate (CDR) per year of 1.5 as a baseline, which was then 
compared to that derived from the retrospective surveys of 2.1, is likely 
to have contributed to an overestimation of the derived estimate of ex-
cess mortality. A sub-Saharan CDR per year of 1.5 used by the IRC can be 
seen as relatively low even from a pre-conflict DRC perspective. In 1984, 
the DRC had a CDR per year close to 1.6 as recorded in the 1984 census 
(Institut National de la Statistique, 1994, p. 17). Given the deteriorating 
economic and political situation in which the country found itself from 
the mid-1980s, it can be argued that the crude death rate is unlikely to 
have decreased to 1.5; the opposite or an increase in CDR per year is 
highly likely.  
Looking at the same conflict, Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2008) raised simi-
lar concerns in relation to the IRC’s choice of mortality baseline and the 
fact that estimates from sub-national clusters in health zones affected by 
war were generalised to the national level. Using a different approach, 
they produced a much lower estimate of the number of excess deaths of 
around 200’000 (in contrast to the 5.4 million produced by the IRC). 
Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2008) projected the 1984 DRC population, as 
recorded in the census, to the year 2006 and matched it with the approxi-
mate DRC population size based on the adult population recorded in the 
2006 voters’ registration. The matching process consisted of comparing 
the size, and age and sex distribution between the projected adult popula-
tion for the period 1998-2005 and the voters’ registration of 2006. 
Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2008) estimated the total number of excess 
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deaths to be 405’759. However, when they considered the fact that mor-
tality during this period was not distributed evenly throughout the 
country, this number was revised down to 222’7624. 
Lambert and Lohlé-Tart based most of their calculations and estimates 
on the 2006 voters’ registration data. However, they were unable to make 
this data source available. Not being able to access Lambert and Lohlé-
Tart’s data makes it impossible effectively to assess their work or repli-







The estimates of excess deaths can be influential, as they inform the poli-
cy of international organisations. Between the onset of the war in the DRC 
                                            
4. http://adrass.net/WordPress/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Surmortalite_ 
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in August 1998 and January 2014, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) adopted 64 resolutions related to the conflict. As shown in Figure 
1 above, the majority of the resolutions passed by the UNSC were adopted 
between 2003 and 2008, coinciding with the IRC’s publication of a series 
of retrospective mortality surveys on the DRC conflict (United Nations 
Security Council, 1999a, 1999b, 2014). Of course, although there tends to 
be an association between the IRC’s publication of the number of excess 
deaths associated with the conflict and the number of UNSC resolutions, 
causation cannot be assumed or evidenced in a meaningful manner. Sev-
eral other contributing factors, such as a threat to regional peace and re-
peated violations of human rights are more likely to have influenced the 
UNSC’s increased attention to the DRC. This is also more likely given the 
fragile situation that characterised the region in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide of the mid-1990s. 
Data and methods 
Data 
This paper combines selected DRC data sources including the latest cen-
sus, held in 1984; two Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), MICS 1 
in 1995 and MICS 2 in 2001; and the Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) of 2007. The census and surveys were used to derive demographic 
estimates and to reconstruct the dynamics of population change since 
1984. Our approach compares two sets of scenarios: factual ones, based 
on our best estimates of what actually happened, and a counter-factual, 
based on a set of assumptions on how the population would have evolved 
in the absence of the 1998-2004 conflict. The study adopts an empirical 
approach, and its findings allow not only comparison with existing stud-
ies, such as Roberts et	al. (2003) and Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2008) but 
also a contribution to the literature on demographic consequences of 
armed conflict. 
It is worth noting that the population of interest in the current study is 
constituted by individuals living in households found in the DRC at the 
time of the different surveys i.e. the 1995 MICS 1, the 2001 MICS 2 and 
the 2007 DHS. The DRC surveys only considered households drawn from 
exhaustive lists of inhabited plots in sampled neighbourhoods or 
dwellings in established villages (rural areas) and Wards (Quartier) in ur-
ban areas based on maps updated from the 1984 census (Ministère du 
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Plan, Reconstruction Nationale RDC, 1995, pp. 120-122; World Bank, 
2018). Internally displaced persons (IDP) or refugees would not be in-
cludeed in this study or form a significant proportion of the population of 
interest (World Bank, 2018). More details of these surveys are provided 
in the data section below. 
General approach 
To estimate the excess mortality associated with armed conflict, several 
methods can be used (Brunborg, Tabeau, 2005). Commonly used meth-
ods include retrospective mortality surveys (Burnham et	al., 2004; Kane, 
2007), matching mortality records from various sources (Tabeau, Bijak, 
2006), population projection under factual and counter-factual scenarios 
(Heuveline, 1998, 2015; Lambert, Lohlé-Tart, 2008), systematic counting 
of direct civilian casualties and the use of advanced technology to scan 
mass graves (Beswick, Minor, 2014) and statistical estimation based on 
multiple sources and multiple systems estimation methods (Price et	al., 
2014). As explained above, in this paper we use population projection 
under factual and counter-factual scenarios. 
Borrowing from Heuveline’s (1998) reconstruction of Cambodia’s war-
related demographic estimates, this study used the cohort-component 
method of population projection and considered the assumption that an 
armed conflict affects all three components of population change. The co-
hort component method was deemed most appropriate because, con-
trary to previous studies that focused on mortality alone using retrospec-
tive mortality surveys (i.e. studies commissioned by the IRC), cohort com-
ponent projection takes into account all three components of population 
change: births, deaths and migration (Siegel, Swanson, 2008) to estimate 
population dynamics associated with armed conflict throughout the con-
sidered projection period. 
Some of the many reasons for adopting cohort component projection for 
this study include its mathematical ease of use which involves little more 
than basic arithmetic, accounting for historical inputs for births, deaths 
and migration to inform contingent but confident predictions of popula-
tion dynamics over a given period. Cohort component projection also 
helps derive meaningful details of the age-sex composition and dynamics 
throughout the considered projection period (Burch, 2018, p. 137). It is 
also worth noting that cohort component projections, as opposed to 
bespoke surveys, are cost-effective, which allows studies with relatively 
modest resources such as the current one to conduct meaningful analyses 
on a complex topic. 
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Despite some of its many strengths, cohort component projection has 
some limitations including the fact that its «standard algorithm is limited, 
linear, and ‘open loop’, and assumes continuity in fertility, mortality and 
migration» (Burch, 2018, p. 138). 
In this study, this limitation was controlled by adjusting the projection 
intervals every five years using direct estimates from intermediate sur-
veys. Despite some of the limitations, cohort component projection is a 
powerful and versatile analytic tool that allowed this study to produce 
not only estimates of population size that are consistent with those from 
alternative reputable sources: the United Nations Population Division 
(2013), the United States Census Bureau (2010), and the DRC’s own office 
for national statistics (Institut National de la Statistique, 2014); but also 
a range of plausible estimates of excess mortality associated with the 
armed conflict. 
Using 1984 as the projection’s launch year, two sets of cohort component 
projections (factual and counter-factual) were conducted for a period of 
30 years divided into five-year intervals. For each, four sets of assump-
tions were used: 
– reference assumptions reflecting the baseline and average rates for each 
component of population change as captured in different data sources and 
at each of the benchmark years (1984, 1995, 2001 and 2007); 
– «lower» assumptions designed to maximise excess mortality by applying the 
highest mortality rate, the lowest fertility rate and the highest net migration 
observed; 
– «upper» assumptions designed to minimise excess mortality by applying the 
lowest mortality rate, the highest fertility rate and the lowest net migration 
observed for each benchmark year; 
– mortality rates from the INDEPTH life tables were also used to conduct addi-
tional population projection exercises (INDEPTH Network 2004, pp. 9-36); 
assumptions based on the INDEPTH life tables provided the projections with 
mortality rates representing relevant mortality patterns in sub-Saharan 
Africa in recent years, taking into account the effect of the HIV/AIDS epidem-
ic. 
For each set of assumptions, the difference in population change between 
the factual and counter-factual scenarios as projected led to an estimate 
of excess mortality. Comparing the results obtained for various assump-
tions gave us an indication of the uncertainty surrounding the level of 
excess mortality. 
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Details of the method 
Panels (i) and (ii) of Table 1 summarise the use of the various data 
sources under the factual and counter-factual scenarios. Under the factu-
al scenario we proceed as follows. 
– The 1984 census data constitute the baseline for forward population projec-
tion to year 1995, using plausible assumptions based on vital rates recorded 
in the 1984 census. This census is also used to benchmark the first projection 
interval. The census information used to derive vital rates and support the 
population projection includes the age composition, the total fertility rate, 
the crude death rate, and the time lived at the current address. 
– In 1995, MICS 1 survey-based estimates are introduced to benchmark the 
next part of the forward population projection up to the year 2001. In this 
projection for the factual scenario, the year 1995 is considered as being 
affected by war, because of the generalised crisis observed throughout the 
country (see the background to the conflict section for more detail) in the 
lead-up to the armed conflict. MICS 1 provided vital rates on births and 
deaths to benchmark the forward population projection between years 1995 
and 2001. 
– In 2001, MICS 2 estimates are introduced to provide vital rates on births and 
deaths to benchmark the next part of the forward population projection up 
to year 2007.  
– In 2007 the DHS data are introduced to provide vital rates on births and 
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Our assumption is that the periods 1995-2001 and 2001-2007 will show 
unusual trends in population dynamics due to the generalised crisis ob-
served across the country throughout this period, including the spill over 
of the Rwandan civil war, the sudden influx of more than one million dis-
placed persons fleeing from Rwanda, and the DRC armed conflict itself. 
The counter-factual scenario (Table 1, panel (ii)) is simpler. The projec-
tion process is similar to the one introduced in panel (i) but here, the main 
assumption is that vital rates (fertility and mortality) recorded in 1984 
converge to those recorded in the 2007 DHS on the basis of a linear 
change. The rates are then kept unchanged for the remainder of the popu-
lation projection up to year 20145. 
For the forward population projection process, starting with the 1984 
population size and composition, we proceeded in a series of five-year 
intervals, in each case calculating the number of persons alive at the be-
ginning of the next projection interval. This was achieved in the usual 
manner, by adding the number of births over the same projection inter-
val, deducting the number of deaths and adjusting for net international 
migration. We iterated this process six times for the factual and counter-
factual scenarios until the end of the projection period in 2014. Different 
vital rates from selected assumptions were used to conduct a series of 
eight population projections: a factual and counter-factual scenario for 
each of the reference, «lower», and «upper» assumptions about vital rates 
and a factual and counter-factual scenario for the INDEPTH assumption 
about mortality was also conducted. 
An aggregate mortality level taking into account HIV/AIDS prevalence 
was implemented in this study using the INDEPTH Model Life Tables for 
sub-Saharan Africa (INDEPTH, 2004). The model life table averaged 
estimates from both the Gwembe (Zambia) and Morogoro (Tanzania) 
sites, as they are more likely to share similar demographic changes to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) than are any other INDEPTH sites 
in the region.  
Despite having on average, a low HIV/AIDS prevalence of below 5%, a 
detailed inspection shows that data on HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in DRC 
are very scanty. In particular, there are no consistent regional data within 
the country. Among women attending antenatal care clinics, for instance, 
the prevalence rate varied significantly from one area to another i.e. 
                                            
5. Although estimates from the interval after 2007 are not a part of the conflict 
period under study (1998-2007), they help in the process of reconstructing a complete 
projection period of 30 years formed of six five-year projection intervals; starting from 
the 1984 census and ending in 2014. 
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between 0.6% in Mikalayi (Kasaï province) and 10.8% in Kinshasa for the 
period 1992 and 1999. HIV sentinel surveys have not been conducted 
regularly and sites have not been used consistently (Dwyer-Lindgren et	
al., 2019). Since the Gwembe INDEPTH site has a high HIV/AIDS preva-
lence, and the Morogoro site has a low HIV/AIDS prevalence, the combi-
nation of the two can be supposed to have an «average» HIV/AIDS preva-
lence. Given the lack of regional data for the DRC, we feel this is the most 
sensible model to use (Unicef, 2004). 
The difference between the factual and counter-factual scenarios resides 
in the fact that for the factual scenario, what actually happened (including 
the effect of conflict) is captured through vital rates from the intermedi-
ate surveys MICS 1, and MICS 2. With the counter-factual scenario, it is 
assumed the conflict did not take place and the forward population pro-
jection only considers the demographic conditions that prevailed at the 
census of 1984 and the DHS of 2007. In other words, the counter-factual 
scenario does not allow for actual demographic changes that may have 
taken place between 1984 and 2007. 
Using cohort component projections, mortality estimates were derived 
from the census and surveys using indirect methods and selected model 
life table systems6. The 1995 MICS1 and the 2001 MICS 2 provided vital 
rates for children and women for the considered period. To reconstruct 
the missing male adult mortality rates, an extrapolation of children and 
women’s mortality using the male age structure from the 1984 census 
was conducted. This was deemed the most appropriate way to reflect re-
alistic population dynamics that prevailed for the periods around which 
the MICS and DHS surveys were carried out. To firm up the choice of these 
mortality rates, different standard model life tables were explored. To 
achieve this, pairs of survivorship probabilities, one from birth and an-
other conditional on attaining a certain age, helped determine a set of sur-
vivorship estimates needed to create a complete life table (Newell 1988). 
From the observed survivorships at younger ages (0 to 19 years) and 
adult ages (20 years and above), as recorded in the census question on 
orphanhood, estimates of the proportions surviving to each age were 
derived using the Brass logit system (United Nations, 1983; Newell, 1988, 
pp. 151-166; Moultrie et	al., 2013)7. 
                                            
6. Model life tables are used for comparison in the assessment of empirical esti-
mates of mortality, to minimise irregularities or otherwise adjust defective mortality es-
timates, and to complete the life table when estimates of mortality are available for only 
a limited range of ages. 
7. For more details, see Kapend et	al. (2013). 
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To derive the harmonised total fertility rate (TFR) the current study used 
reported numbers of births per 1’000 by five-year age-groups of women 
aged from 15 to 49 years for the period 1985-1989 from Shapiro and 
Tambashe (2003, p. 55). These were harmonised with the mid-year total 
number of live births from women aged 15 to 49 years as recorded in the 
DRC 1984 Census. In other words, the current study used the 1984 Cen-
sus to determine the level of fertility and the findings of Shapiro and 
Tambashe (2003) to determine the age distribution. Thus, the crude birth 
rate was estimated from the 1984 Census data. A ratio was calculated first 
by dividing the number of children enumerated aged under one year by 
the total enumerated population (Shapiro, Tambashe 2003). The calculat-
ed ratio was then adjusted to account for the children born in the year 
preceding the census who had died before the census date by dividing it 
by the number of infants aged under one year in a life table population 
with mortality equal to that of the 1980s in the DRC8. Direct estimates of 
fertility found in more recent surveys including MICS 1, MICS 2 and the 
DHS, were then used under the factual scenario. Finally, age-specific 
fertility estimates from MICS (1995, 2001) and DHS (2007) were directly 
applied to the model to benchmark population projections, as shown in 
Table 1. 
Estimates of net migration were obtained from the World Bank 9 . To 
achieve a better fit for age profiles this study proceeded as follows: first, 
we fitted a model schedule for total net migration counts; and, second, we 
derived age-specific net international migration figures to be used in co-
hort component projections. Age-specific migration volumes were esti-
mated by making assumptions on key parameters following the approach 
proposed by Wilson (2010) and the accompanying curve-fitting tool. 
These were standardised by using proportions from the 1984 Census and 
2007 DHS questions on how long each respondent had lived at his or her 
current address. 
Each of the data sources used in the analysis has its advantages and disad-
vantages. Sensitivity analysis was conducted at key stages in the process 
                                            
8. Let l0 be the number of babies born each year in the life table population and L0 
be the number alive aged under one year. Then the chance that a baby born in a given year 
would be alive at the end of that year is L0/l0. The ratio obtained from the census is equal 
to P0/Ptot, where P0 is the enumerated population aged under one year and Ptot is the total 
enumerated population. If the number of births in the year preceding the census is B then 
the required crude birth rate is B/Ptot, and assuming that P0/B = L0/l0, we have B = P0l0/L0 
and the crude birth rate = B/Ptot = P0(l0/L0)/Ptot. 
9. Source: http://data.worldbank.org/country/congo-dem-rep [accessed 20 No-
vember 2012]. 
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to justify the use of particular assumptions. Sensitivity analysis allowed 
us to derive a range of plausible estimates within which this study be-
lieves true figure of excess mortality lies. Table 1 summarises the data 
sources utilised in this study to derive the estimates. 
Results 
Results obtained under various assumptions and scenarios show that the 
size of the DRC population has been rapidly growing throughout the pro-
jection period (Table 2 and Figure 2). In most cases estimates of natural 
increase (births minus deaths), as well as the overall population growth, 
are higher for the counter-factual scenario than for the factual one. How-
ever, this is not the case under the lower assumptions where the opposite 
trend is observed mainly due to a set of irregular and extreme rates ob-
served. In other words, the lower bound assumption set out to minimise 
the overall population growth by combining the highest observed mortal-
ity rates, the lowest observed fertility rates and the lowest observed net 
migration rates under the counterfactual projection scenario. This led to 
an overall lower population growth under the lower-bound assumption 









Natural increase  49’957’467  51’399’889  54’641’144  64’915’300 
Births  73’892’720  71’176’211  77’866’633  75’396’477 
Deaths  23’935’253  19’776’321  23’225’489  19’066’557 
Net migration  ‐836’232  26’855  ‐836’232  26’855 
Population growth rate (per cent per year)  3.22  3.28  3.41  3.79 
  «Lower» assumption  «Upper» assumption 
Natural increase  39’942’471  37’346’015  61’596’839  67’740’612 
Births  62’584’498  56’058’611  84’668’574  84’453’827 
Deaths  22’642’027  18’712’596  23’071’735  16’713’214 
Net migration  ‐388’170  448’458  ‐388’170  ‐143’850 
Population growth rate (per cent per year)  2.78  2.65  3.67  3.89 
















To check the robustness of population size projected under the reference 
assumption, using observed average rates, it was important to compare 
with existing projections from alternative reputable sources. Table 3 
shows DRC population projections as conducted in the mid-2010s by se-
lected authoritative sources: the United Nations Population Division 
(2013), the United States Census Bureau (2010) and the DRC’s Institut 
National de la Statistique (2014, pp. 69-71). These projections covered 
the period from 1984 to 2015. The projected population size tends to be 
similar between the selected sources earlier in the projection cycle, but 
changes between 1989 and 1995, where there are more substantial dif-
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again between 1999 and 2009. The reference population projection con-
ducted in this study is broadly consistent with that from these alternative 
sources. It is worth noting that, as expected, the further away the selected 
projections moved from the 1984 census, the less consistent they be-
came. In other words, there is a relative decrease in accuracy of the pro-

















































































































1984  30’674  33’348  31’044  30’674  30’674  33’348 
1984‐1989  35’578  39’151  36’406 
 
35’578  39’151 
1989‐1994  41’969  46’705  44’067 
 
41’969  46’705 
1994‐1999  50’004  52’445  49’626  52’099  49’626  52’445 
1999‐2004  58’282  60’698  57’421  60’566  57’421  60’698 
2004‐2009  68’539  69’851  65’966  71’587  65’966  71’587 





Figure 3 shows net migration in the DRC as provided by the United Na-
tions Population Division from 1950 to 2010. The level of net migration 
fluctuated between zero and 250’000 whilst remaining positive (meaning 
more people coming into the country than leaving) from 1950 to the early 
1980s. This level then peaked between early 1990 and 1995 before drop-
ping to negative figures (more people leaving the country than coming 
in). The period 1995-2005 was dominated by the impact of 1994 Rwan-
dan genocide which saw more than a million people crossing the border 
from Rwanda to the DRC in 1995: a similar movement was observed 
almost five years later, but in the opposite direction from the DRC to 
Rwanda. From 2005 to 2010 the overall level of net international migra-
tion has been negative at the beginning of the period, trending to zero or 
slightly positive values toward the end of the decade. 
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There do not seem to be reports on mortality in camps for displaced per-
sons. But the limited evidence of mortality by region in the DRC does not 
support the view that mortality was higher in those regions where the 
camps were (Lindskog, 2016). Also, given that the mortality rates both 
direct and indirect estimates and scenarios included to model population 
change in this study are representative of the country as a whole, it is hard 
to conclude that excess mortality in camps would have a significant effect 




Source:  United Nations  Population Division,  population  estimates  and  projections  section.  Latest 
data available at https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/ [accessed 6 July 2019]. 
Fertility 
Like migration, fertility has not significantly influenced population 
change in the DRC for the projection period. Figure 4 shows that different 
studies produced similar age-specific fertility schedules although with 
some minor differences. Our 1985-1989 schedule, based on Shapiro and 
Tambashe (2003), is similar to those from intermediate surveys. MICS 
(1995, 2001) and DHS (2007) data provided age specific fertility obtained 
using direct methods in their respective surveys. Except for the years 
1985-1989, it can be seen that early fertility levels tend to be higher than 
recent ones, implying a possible, though small, decline in fertility. 
Overall, the number of births tended to be higher under the factual sce-
nario compared to the counterfactual one. In the context of the DRC, this 
could be explained by the fact that the factual scenario projected more 
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scenario, since having more people of reproductive age in the projection 
design impacts on the overall number of births. Historically, substantial 
differences in fertility levels in DRC have been associated with ethnicity 
but this has receded in importance since 2000 whilst education, particu-
larly at secondary level and beyond has emerged as the most prominent 
factor (Shapiro and Tambashe 2017). From the current study, it is not 
possible to ascertain whether education is a significant factor in explain-
ing the difference in births between the factual and counterfactual sce-
narios. Romaniuk (2011, p. 1) expressed that reproductive behaviour in 
the tropical Africa region or indeed the DRC is «metaphorically	speaking,	
in	a	kind	of	no	man’s	land	where	tensions	between	the	forces	resisting	the	
transition	and	those	propelling	it	are	at	an	impasse	with	no	resolution	yet	
in	sight». Based on findings from the current study, fertility has roughly 
remained at the same level throughout the period of armed conflict con-











To sum up the impact of armed conflict on the other all components of 
population change, neither net international migration, nor fertility have 
had a significant effect on population change over the period under study. 
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it would not have been adequate to derive estimates of excess mortality 
without accounting for all three components of population change. Had 
this study considered shorter periods, net international migration could 
have a significant impact on population change; mainly due to significant 
influxes observed around key moments in the Rwandan civil war as 
shown in Figure 3. 
Derived excess mortality 
Table 4 provides a range of estimates of excess mortality between 1998 
and 2007 based on the factual and the counter-factual scenarios using 
four sets of demographic assumptions: reference, «lower», «upper» and 
INDEPTH. The reference assumption produced an estimated number of 
deaths of 6’574’000 over the period under the counter-factual scenario, 
and 8’150’000 over the period under the factual scenario. The difference 
between these two figures implies the estimate of around 1’576’000 
excess deaths associated with the conflict. The other three assumptions 













Reference  8’150’000  6’574’000  1’576’000 
«Lower»  8’019’000  6’293’000  1’726’000 
«Upper»  6’883’000  5’841’000  1’042’000 




To sum up, findings from this study indicate that for the period 1998-
2007 the excess mortality estimates associated with the DRC armed con-
flict range from a minimum of 1 million to a maximum of nearly 2 million 
deaths, under generally plausible assumptions. These can directly be 
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compared with previous estimates from the IRC of 5.4 million deaths be-
tween years 1998 and 2007 (Coghlan et	 al., 2009) and Lambert and 
Lohlé-Tart’s (2008) of just over 200’000 deaths in the same period. 
This study, in line with those of Heuveline (1998, 2015), demonstrates 
the usefulness and value added of the demographic approach by provid-
ing plausible boundaries within which the excess mortality estimates are 
likely to lie. Similarly, Tabeau and Bijak (2006) analysed widely divergent 
pre-existing estimates of excess mortlity in Bosnia using demographic 
techniques. In this sense, the current paper fits within the tradition of the 
mainstream demography of armed conflict by adding a demographic 
perspective and rigour to the estimation process. 
The approach adopted in the current paper has limitations that are asso-
ciated with both the data and the methods. However, our forward popula-
tion projections were compared against existing sources to assess their 
robustness. In addition, population size and the expectations of life at 
birth produced in this study were compared with more recent estimates 
produced by the United Nations and the World Bank. The recent surveys 
do not provide enough information at sub-national levels that would 
allow the estimation of the impact of the armed conflict in specific areas 
of the country. However, projected estimates of population size at nation-
al level are broadly consistent with those produced by agencies including 
the Institut National de la Statistique of the DRC and the United Nations 
Population Division. 
The IRC’s estimates of excess mortality have been widely adopted despite 
their limitations (Burnham et	 al., 2004; Pedersen 2009). The current 
paper expanded on the limitations associated with both the IRC’s studies 
and the unpublished study by Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2008) to highlight 
some of the issues and, where possible, suggest alternatives. The impor-
tance of considering competing analytical frameworks when assessing 
demographic consequences associated with armed conflicts has also 
been highlighted in this paper. Given that studies in this field deal with 
the human cost associated with armed conflicts, a highly sensitive issue, 
there is a potential for far-reaching consequences. This would include, for 
instance, the perception of victimhood and its impact on any prospects of 
lasting peace and state building in the medium to long-term (Eck, Hänni, 
2013). Basing international policies on potentially contentious statistics 
risks feeding sentiments of revenge and contributing to the raising of 
tensions amongst populations in affected regions. 
To prevent the contentious production or use of statistics associated with 
armed conflict, it is important that future interventions consider the fol-
lowing: 
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– the identification of competing assessment tools and methods to select the 
most realistic upon which any intervention plan can be based; 
– a comprehensive review of existing processes in selecting assessment tools 
and the effective communication of this review with interveners and the af-
fected communities; and  
– avoiding a focus on a single «best» estimate of excess death, given the uncer-
tainties associated with the estimation process. 
By doing this, it will be possible to produce figures that are less likely to 
feed controversy and foment future conflicts and sentiments of victim-
hood, even though the price to pay for that is to acknowledge the in-
evitable estimation errors. This will further contribute to the de-escala-
tion of tensions, promote conditions for peace and strengthen state ca-
pacities in post-conflict situations. 
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